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Trends  and  developments:·  research   on  emotions 
Commentaries 
Frequency estimates of emotions in everyday 
life from a diary method's perspective: 
a comment on Scherer et al.'s survey-study 
"Emotions in everyday life" 
Although there  have been decades of intensive research on different 
facets of emotions (for an overview of current research topics see 
Davidson et  al.,  2003;  Lewis  and  Haviland-Jones,  2000),  we  do 
not know  much  about  the  emotional  experiences  people  usually 
have in their daily lives. In particular there is a lack of knowledge 
about the "incidence"  of  emotions  in  ordinary  daily  !ife. Therefore, 
the research questions of Scherer and his colleagues  (this  issue) 
about the  probability  of  the  occurrence  of  particular  emotions 
during an ordinary day, about potential "risk factors", 1 respective ly 
moderator variables  and  typical  appraisal  and  reaction  patterns,  are 
of high  interest. 
To answer these questions Scherer et al. used a population-survey 
methodo logy by which they were able to collect data from more 
than 1,000 German- and French-speaking Swiss adults. Participants 
were asked to report an emotional event that happened "yesterday". 
We t h an k lan Law for h is he1p i n  improvi ng t he Eng lish of t his art icle. 
Social Science I nformation © 2004 SAGE Publi cat ion s (london , Thousand Oaks, CA and  New 
Delh i ),  0539-0184 
DO!: 10. 1177/05390 18404047712 Vol 43(4 ), pp. 647-665; 0477 12 
The focus on yesterday's emotional events can be considered as real 
progress compared to previous questionnaire studies. In those 
studies participants reported on emotional experiences that had 
happened weeks ago (e.g. Scherer and Wallbott, 1994). Because 
recall biases increase with the time !ag between the event and its 
recording, the reliability as weil as the validity of such reports can 
be questioned . 
Thus, Scherer et al.'s approach, asking people to report an event 
that elicited an emotion the preceding day, appears to be a quite 
reasonable strategy for obtaining information on how likely it is 
that an average person in a given population will experience a cer- 
tain emotion . However, we think that this strategy also has sorne 
problems, which will be discussed here. 
Imagine an ideal participant in the Scherer et al. study. She (or he) 
would do the following: She finds the letter from the Geneva 
research group, probably after coming home from work. She opens 
the letter, reads the background information and answers the ques- 
tionnaire immediately. When she follows the instructions and recall s 
yesterday, she clearly remembers one event that caused her to experi- 
ence a certain emotion . She completes the questionnaire and sends it 
back to the research group. 
Although there are participants who behave this way, many do 
not. Methodological studies on diary research have revealed that 
participants often do not follow the instructions and tend to com- 
plete questions later than expected, while relying on their memory 
(e.g. Hank and Schwenkmezger, 1996; Stone et al., 2002). lt is also 
quite probable that, in the Scherer et al. study, participants did 
not find the time to complete the  questionnaire the  same day. 
Thus, the latency between the event and its report might have 
been longer than expected, increasing the severity of recall biases . 
Other participants who did not remember an emotional event yester - 
day might have waited until an event occurred that seemed worth - 
while reporting. For such participants the time frame was larger, 
and therefore the  probability of finding an emotional event to 
report was higher. However, most people did not respond to the 
letter from the Geneva research group at ali, and it is not known 
how many of the non -responders did not participate in the study 
because they did not remember an emotional event the day befor e. 
On the other hand we have strong reasons to believe that many of 
the participants experienced  more than one emotional event the 
previous day. However, to answer the questions of the  Geneva 
group the subjects had to select just one event and ignore the others. 
To summarize: there are different factors influencing the observed 
base rates of emotions in different directions . Un til these factors can 
be quantified, the  reported base rates are somehow arbitrary and 
rather biased estimates of the true base rates in the population. 
In our commentary we would like to discuss these problems from 
a diary or experience-sampling perspective (Bolger et al., 2003; Buse 
and Pawlik, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1987; Fahrenberg, 
1996; Fahrenberg et al., 2002; Larson and Delespaul, 1992; Perrez 
et al., 2000; Wilhelm and Perrez, 2001) . We will present results 
from the literature and from our own studies, which  are based on 
diary and computer-assisted ambulatory assessment in daily lives. 
Comparison with quite similar questions answered with diary- 
assessment approaches will  tell us whether Scherer et al.'s results 
can be confirmed or need to be modified . 
Retrospective recall biases 
In the study of Scherer et al. participants were asked to report an 
emotional event that happened the preceding day. What they 
reported was therefore recalled from their  long-term  memory. 
There is an extensive literature on processes that may affect the 
retrospective recall of events and subjective experiences (Fahrenberg 
et al., 2002; Hufford et al., 2001) . Before events and experiences can 
be recalled, they have to be encoded . Whether something is encoded 
or not is inftuenced by its salience, the person's state, distracting 
stimuli, etc. (encoding biases). The recall of an event or an experi - 
ence depends on its proximity. More recent events are more acces- 
sible. In addition, people are likely to recall  an event when  they 
are in the same state or mood. Thus, they are more likely to recall 
a sad experience when they are in a sad mood  than  when  in  a 
happy mood and vice versa. Moreover, retrievals are influenced by 
tendencies to reconstruct events or experiences so as to make them 
consistent with memories and subsequent interpretations of events 
and experiences . 
Although recall biases do increase with the amount of time 
elapsed between an event experienced and its report, there is 
evidence that recall biases already operate in the short term, when 
yesterday's events are remembered. 
A negative bias has been found when diary reports of emotional 
and phys1cal states and the occurrence of certain events have been 
compared to retrospective reports given one or several days later. 
The retrospective reports of states were worse than  the  actual 
states experienced (El-Giamal, 1999; Fahrenberg et al., 2001; 
Kappler and Rieder, 2001). The same was true for reports of nega- 
tive events, like the frequency and severity of panic attacks 
(Margraf, 1990). These negative retrospective effects might be con- 
founded with aggregation or summary biases that occur when an 
average state or the frequency of an event in a given time period 
has to be estimated (e.g. last day, last seven days, last month). How- 
ever, in the data of the Third Fribourg Family Project (Perrez et al., 
in press) we found the same negative bias when family members 
judged how they felt yesterday morning. Although effects were 
smaller, they indicate that there is a tendency to remember one's 
state as worse than it was experienced at the time. 
The fact that even short-term recall biases exist is a strong argu- 
ment for getting information about the experience as rapidly as 
possible. This can be done by using a diary approach (event samp- 
ling or various time sampling over the course of a  day)  (e.g. 
Bolger et al., 2003; Fahrenberg et al., 2002) . If, in  addition, the 
diary is implemented  on a handheld  computer,  the compliance of 
a persan (like the time and duration of a report) can be strictly 
controlled. 
For the Scherer et al. study we assume that results were inftuenced 
by recall biases. Due to the negative retrospection effect, we would 
expect that negative emotional events had a greater  chance  of 
being remembered and reported than positive events. As can be 
inferred from Scherer et al.'s Table 2, the frequencies of negative 
emotions seem to confirm our assumption. Approximately 57 per- 
cent of the emotions that could be classified had a negative valence, 
about 36 percent had a positive valence and about 7 percent were 
rather neutral, or could be either positive, negative or mixed. The 
high proportion of negative emotions becomes  striking  if  one 
takes frequency estimates of negative and positive emotional states 
into account that are based on different diary and experience- 
sample studies (Kappler, 1994; Larson and Richards, 1994; Myrtek, 
2004; Perrez  et al., 1998b). In these  studies in  which the  actual 
state was assessed at various times of the day, positive emotions 
were more frequent than negative emotions (see also our Table 1). 
One might argue that differences between the diary studies and 
Scherer et al. in the assessment procedures as weil as the samples 
may be responsible for the different results. However, the negative 
retrospection effect can not be ruled out as a plausible  factor that 
bi ases the odd ratios of Scherer et al.. 
How many people did not experience  any emotion yesterday? 
A crucial point for Scherer et al.'s intention to estimate base rates of 
the occurrence of emotions is the fact that it is unknown how many 
people did not participate in the study because they did not remem- 
ber having experienced an emotional event the day before. 
Scherer et al. tried to infer this frequency by assuming that a 
general response rate of about 35 percent could be expected in popu- 
lation surveys. In contrast to that expectation, their own response 
rate was rather low (about 17 percent). They concluded that this 
was in part due to people not having experienced an emotion the pre- 
ceding day and therefore not participating . Their estimate was that 
one out of two people might not  remember  having experienced a 
strong enough emotional event the last day . 
Using the data of the First Fribourg Family Project , we are able to 
contribute more empirical evidence on that question. In this diary 
study, which was conducted from 1996 to 1997 in Switzerland, we 
asked 96 mothers, 81 fathers and 162 adolescents from 96 fami lies 
to report their current mood and feelings, and to answer additional 
questions 7 times a day over the course of one week. Ali together we 
obtained 15,907 single reports (Perrez et al., l998a, l998b; a detailed 
documentation of the diary can be found in Zbinden, 2003). Family 
members were instructed to respond to the questions after mea ls 
(breakfast, lunch , dinner) and at li am, 3 pm, 5 pm and 9 pm. To 
indicate their current feelings, they could choose from a list of 
items which best corresponded to their actual state (items are pre- 
sented in Table 1). Analysis revea led that 90 percent of the parents 
and 97 percent of the adolescents reported at !east one emotion 
per day.2
Results of other ambulatory assessment studies support our 
findings . Myrtek (2004) and colleagues (Myrtek et al., 2001) for 
example conducted three psychophysio logical monitoring stud ies 
over 23 hours, in which they continuous ly measured different ECG 
parameters and the physical activity of the participants (50 female 
and 50 nl'ale students). Every 10 to 20 minutes, participants received 
a signal th at asked them to indicate if they were experiencing happi- 
ness, anger, anxietyjfear, sadness, surprise, disgust or "no emotion" 
at that particular moment (only one emotion could be chosen). 3
Women reported feeling an emotion about 40 percent and men 
about 30 percent of the time. In addition participants had the oppor- 
tunity to record their psychological state without being signaled, 
whenever they felt an emotion. Almost 80 percent of the women 
and at !east 50 percent of the men used that option . Although 
Myrtek  does  not  report  how  many  participants  experienced  at 
!east one  emotion  during  the  monitoring,  we  can  infer  from  his 
data that almost everybody did. 
Thus, we conclude that most people regularly experience sorne 
kind of emotion. According to Myrtek's and our own data, we esti- 
ma te the base rate of experiencing any emotion on a given day to be 
90 percent or more. However, if one asks people about yesterday's 
emotional experience, sorne of them may not remember that they 
had sorne kind of feeling, others may think their emotional experi- 
ence was  not worthwhile reporting, especially when  the intensity 
was low and the underlying event quite ordinary. Therefore,  we 
would expect that more people would report not having experienced 
an emotion if they were asked a day later. 
How many times do people experience an emotion during an 
ordinary day? 
Scherer et al.'s probabilities will be too low if people frequent!y 
experience more than one emotional  event  per  day. We  refer  to 
the studies we introduced before to obtain estimates of how many 
emotions peop le might experience over the day. 
An average parent in the First Fribourg Family Project reported 
every second observation that he or she was feeling a certain emo- 
tional state (M =52%, SD = 23) .4 For adolescents this frequency 
was even higher (M = 71%, SD = 21). This means that an average 
adult person felt an emotion at !east three or four times a day. The 
standard deviation further indicates that there were huge individual 
differences. Sorne people reported experiencing an emotion in 
almost every situation, others indicated an emotion  only  two  or 
three times during the whole week . 
According to Myrtek's (2004) results, people tend to fee! a specifie 
emotion even more often: females about 20 times (40 percent of the 
observations) and males about 15 times (30 percent) per day. 
The first  conclusion to be drawn from these results is that an 
answer to the question how often people experience an emotion per 
day depends on how often  and  in  what  manner  they  are asked . 
In Myrtek's studies the frequency of single emotional events is over- 
estimated when one does not take into account that one and the 
same emotion may last longer than a couple of minutes. According 
to Scherer et al. (Table 12) for example most participants experi- 
enced happiness as lasting an hour or longer. Thus, the number of 
distinct emotion-eliciting events is probably much smaller. 
In addition, one might argue that the high frequency of emotional 
states in Myrtek's studies, but also in our family study, might in part 
be a result of a sensitization effect that is due to the questioning 
procedure. The repeated questioning directs the attention of the par- 
ticipants towards their emotional state and encourages them to 
report emotional states of low intensity. This is definitely true for 
our family study, in which intense emotional states were rare. 
To summarize: although the number of different emotions experi- 
enced on a given day might be lower than the estimates drawn from 
Myrtek's studies, we believe that it is quite common that people 
experience more than one emotion  per day. Thus, the Scherer et 
al. study is likely to underestimate  the probability  of experiencing 
a certain emotion on a given day because it allows participants to 
report only one emotion. 
One reason why repeated emotional experiences can be observed 
on a single day might be that emotions are more likely to occur in 
clusters, within the broader context of one and the same event. 
Appraisal theory suggests that the appraisal of situations or events 
elicits emotions (e.g. Roseman and Smith, 2001; Scherer, 2001) . If 
we assume that these events are particularly salient to the respon- 
dents, it is likely that the content of the experienced situation is 
not of an isolated significance but rather an issue that accompanies 
the respondent over a certain period of time. lt is quite probable 
that, during the unfolding or temporal course of such an event, 
various appraisals are triggered. As conceptualized by Perrez and 
Reicherts (1992), in order to capture the appraisal of stressful 
events, one can think of different micro-episodes that occur within 
one and  the  same  macro-event.  Consequent ly  the  probability  of 
experiencing further emotions would be likely to be elevated as long 
as the issue is at stake. 
In a situation of lost luggage, for example, as studied by Scherer 
and Ceschi (1997), a passenger might experience anger or worry at 
first and subsequently experience relief after obtaining positive 
information from the airline agent. Likewise  he or she might first 
experience anger due to the Joss of his or her luggage and then 
experience anger because of the unfriendly and unsupportive beha - 
vior of the airline agent or worry because he or she thinks that 
important items might have been !ost definitely. These further emo- 
tions may be distinct from the initial  emotions because they may 
occur after the offset of the initial experience and  they  may  be 
based  on appraisals with a different content. 
We found empirical evidence for this reasoning in the data of our 
Second and Third Family Project, in which 314 participants from 
96  families  and  277  participants  from  77  families,  respectively, 
completed  a diary that was implemented  on a handheld  computer 
(FASEM-C).  Six  times  each  day  over  the  course  of  the  week, 
every family member was asked, among various questions, how he 
or she felt at the current moment  (for a more detailed  description 
of the samples and the procedure  see Perrez et al., 2000; Schoebi, 
2004;   Wilhelm, 2004). We found that the occurrence  of a certain 
emotion  increased  the  probability   of  experiencing  the  same  or 
another  emotion  one  or  several  observations  later.5  These  effects 
can be understood as cluster effects with regard to the timeline. 
Parents in both samples were significantly more likely to report emo- 
tional experiences of worry, stress and anger if they had experienced 
the same type of emotion one, two or three observation  periods 
before. Moreover, we found that, after experiencing anger, parents 
were more likely to report sadness, worry and stress. Likewise, 
experiences of worry and stress increased the probability of report- 
ing sadness subsequently. This also holds true when controlling for 
neuroticism (measured with the emotionality scale of the FPI-R, 
Fahrenberg et al., 1989), which was associated with reporting more 
negative emotional states. 
In conclusion our findings suggest that the probability that differ- 
ent emotions are experienced is e1evated within the 1arger context of 
one and the same emotion -eliciting event, and bence the probability 
of occurrence varies. 
Representativity 
Scherer et al.'s reason for using the survey approach was to get 
representative population estimates of the frequency of the occur- 
rence of various emotions. A basic question for every population 
survey is how weil the sample represents the population. 
In general, representativity is an ideal that is difficult to realize 
in social and behavioral research. Although the people invited to 
participate in a study can be chosen so that they represent the popu- 
lation fairly - as in the study of Scherer et al. - the participants who 
actually respond to  the questions are always a self-selected sub- 
group. This subgroup is usually distinct from the population with 
respect to important characteristics (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1991). 
Most  of  the  results  Scherer  et  al.  present  are  based  on  the 
responses of 1 out of 8 people who were asked to participa te (from 
8940 households 1520 questionnaires were returned, however, only 
1030 questionnaires could be used because the quality of emotions 
were labeled). Thus, the population to which the results can be 
generalized is not defined by the people asked to participate in the 
study. lt needs to be inferred from the characteristics of the subjects 
who participated. They belong to the subpopulation of the rather 
well-functioning, better-educated, German- or French-speaking 
people living in Switzèrland who are willing to reveal their private 
experience to a research institution. Social minorities as weil as 
people in a difficult physical or mental state are likely to be under- 
represented. However, one needs to mention that diary studies are 
usually far more selective. 
Frequency estimates of emotional states from the First Fribourg 
Family Project 
After having discussed sorne potential threats that may bias Scherer 
et al.'s probability rates, we would like to compare sorne results from 
our diary studies with results from Scherer et al. Direct comparison 
of the relative frequencies is quite difficult, however, because of the 
different assessment methodologies underlying the two samples. 
In our Table 1 we present frequencies of emotional states that 
were reported by the parents of the First Fribourg Family Project.6
Feeling happy was the most frequent emotional state. An average 
TABLE 1 
Frequencymeasures of emotional states from 177 parents, who completed diaries 7 times 
per day over the course of a week (First Fribourg Family Project, Perrez et al., 1998b) 
Percent  of observations Percent  of 
per personb persons per 
M SD daye 
(%) (%) 
Anxious, fearfu l , uncertaina 2.8 6.7 11.6 
Sad, depressed, discouraged 3. 1 4.8 14.5 
Angry, furious, irritated 3.5 3.9 19.1 
Ashamed,  inhi bited 0.5 1.2 3.3 
Feeling sensitive or hurt 1.6 3.0 9.0 
Tense, rushed, or nervous 12.4 11.1 46.3 
Unsatisfied 5.4 6.8 25.4 
Other negative feelings 1.3 3.8 6.3 
Proud 5.3 12.1 19.1 
Happy 28 .3 25.0 62.8 
Other positive feelings 2.9 6.3 12.4 
Positive feelingsd 28.3 23.6 65.4 
Negative  feelings 19.6 13.1 63.0 
Mixed feelings 3.8 7.4 16.0 
No feelings 47 .9 23.3 9.8 
Notes: • In addition the items tiredjexhausted; quiet/relaxedjbalanced; encouraged/ 
motivated were presented, which we omit here because they were basically mood 
indicators. 
b For every person the relative frequency (percent) of reports over time was com- 
puted. The  group mean and standard deviation of these intra-individual  percent 
scores are reported. 
c For every day the percentage was computed of people who reported an item at 
!east once. The presented percent score is the average over the seven days. 
d Because multiple responses were possible, we classified different feelings that were 
reported at the same time as indicating either a positive, negative, or mixed state. 
person reported happiness every fourth observation (Table 1, col. 1) 
and about two out of three people indicated feeling happy at !east 
once a day (Table 1, col. 3). In contrast, in  the  Scherer  et  al. 
study, the happy emotions (happiness, joy and contentment)  were 
reported by only every sixth participant. However, they were also 
the most frequently mentioned  emotions there. 
Feeling "tense, rushed or nervous" was reported by almost every 
second person in the family project at !east once a day. The corre- 
sponding item in the Scherer et al. study - "stress" - was far Jess 
frequent. The same was true for ali the other items, but especially for 
pride and dissatisfaction. 
One simple reason for this discrepancy is the fact that Scherer et 
al. asked the participants to label their emotions themselves. After 
classifying the items, they ended up with 38 different emotional 
states. In the family study, respondents chose from a  list  of  12 
items. The basic probability of one or severa ! items being chosen 
from a menu of 12 items is higher than the probability of the same 
items being freely Iisted. Therefore we cannot simply interpret the 
higher frequencies we get in our study as a support for our argument 
that Scherer et al. underestimate  frequencies because they did not 
take into account that severa! emotions might have been experienced 
the day before. 
However, the pattern of results also reveals sorne similarities with 
Scherer et al. If one ignores the items "feeling tense, rushed or 
nervous" and "unsatisfied", which were doser to mood states, the 
most frequently reported negative emotion in our study was anger, 
as in the study of Scherer et al. After anger, sadness and anxiety 
were the most frequent negative emotions in bath studies. 
According to our data intense negative emotions were very rare. 
When indicating the intensity of feeling anxious, angry or sad, par- 
ticipants reported in more than half of the cases that they felt that 
emotion only slightly. Only 5 percent of the sad and anxious experi- 
ences and 10 percent of the anger experiences were rated as strong. 
The standard deviations in Table 1 indicate that individual differ- 
ences were large . For example, there were participants who reported 
every situation to be happy, whereas other participants did  not 
report even one situation in which they felt happy. This result indi- 
cates that differences between people might be due to differences in 
their emotional experience . However, they are also affected by 
response styles. 
Aside from the many differences between the results in Scherer et 
al.'s study and our own, we can conclude that happiness tends to be 
the most frequent basic emotion in daily !ife, followed by anger, 
anxiety and sadness. Quite similar resu lts have also been found in 
the studies of Myrtek (2004). 
Exploring situational factors that may affect the probability  of 
experiencing  emotions 
Happy 21.7 47.3 11.1 40.0 40.0 70.9 W<<<H< <P 
Angry 2 .9 7.1 0 5.5 0 0 P<<<H ....... 
Anxious 0 3.2 0 0 0 0 ....., 








Frequencies of different emotions in different settings reported by 140 parents of the First Fribourg Family Project who bad at !east one protocol in - 
each setting 
....... -§., 
At home At work ln public Pairwise "' 
Median 75%-quartile Median 75%-quartile Median 75%-quartile Wilcoxon tests• 
<:;· 
Tensed    8.3   17.6    16.7   42.0  0.0   16.7  P<H<W 
"' 
Notes: Because distributions were heavily skewed the means and standard deviations are not adequate indicators and we therefore report the 
median and the 75%-quartile. The 25% -quartile was not reported because it was 0 except for happy at home (9.7% ) and for "tense, rushed 
or nervous" at home (2.8%). 
• H = at home, W = at work , P == in the public .
Direction and significance of the Wilcoxon test are indicated by the "larger than" sign:  <  == p  < .05;  < <  == p  < .01;  < < <  == p  < .00 1. 
Scherer et al. explored many factors that influence the probabilities 
of experiencing emotions. Closer examination of the analysis of 
situational factors may help to illustrate interpretational problems 
resulting from Scherer et al.'s approach. We will also emphasize 
the strength of the diary assessment in dealing with these problems. 
In Table 5, Scherer et al. present "situational risk factors" for the 
most frequent emotions. They found that the work setting increases 
the probability of experiencing anger and stress, and decreases the 
probability of experiencing  happiness and sadness. Likewise they 
found increased rates for anxiety and decreased rates for anger at 
home, but lower rates of stress in  a public place .  However, the 
conclusions that can be  drawn  from  these  results  are limited  by 
the fact that different persons report different emotions in different 
situations . As a consequence the sample on which the results  are 
based is different for  each emotion and rather small. Moreover, 
situational factors and characteristics of the person are unequivo- 
cally confounded. 
The great  strength of diary assessment  is that, as information  is 
gathered repeatedly in different situations, it is possible to analyze 
situationa l factors within persons, keeping persona! characteristics 
constant. Thus, the interpretation of situational effects is Jess chal- 
lenged by confounding effects due to differences between persans 
(Bolger et al., 2003). 
On the basis of our data, we analyzed situational differences in the 
frequencies of emotion reports. For this purpose we computed the 
relative frequency of emotions for  each  participant  when  he  or 
she was at home, at work or in a public place.  As shown in our 
Table 2, the feelings of tension, being rushed, and nervous (i.e. indi- 
cators of feeling stressed) were most frequent at work, whereas feel- 
ings of happiness were the least frequent. So far these results are in 
Iine with Scherer et al. However, we did not find significantly 
increased rates of anger, nor did we find significantly  decreased 
rates of sadness at work, and we found neither Jess anger nor more 
anxiety at home . In our study participants were more often happy 
and Jess often stressed at home as compared to the workplace. As 
our results show, participants felt best in a public place. That  is 
where they most often experienced happiness and least often anger, 
sadness and tension. 
Although these results are not challenged by confounding effects 
due to person characteristics, the local setting is only one component 
that goes along with many other factors that have been  shown to 
influence emotional states, such as the time of day, the presence or 
absence of other people and the current activity one is involved in 
 Wilhelm, 2001). By using multilevel analysis (Goldstein, 1995; 
Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002), the effects of each of these factors 
can be estimated and controlled (see Wilhelm, 2001, for an analysis 
of the emotional state offamily members). In our view such analysis 
based on data gathered with modern computer-assisted diaries or 
other ambulatory assessment deviees (see Fahrenberg and Myrtek, 
2001 for an overview) would be the most promising approach to 
explore the impact of different situational factors on emotional 
experiences in everyday lives. 
Conclusions 
Scherer et al.'s study on "Emotions in everyday !ife" directs atten- 
tion to a  challenging research question. lt focuses on the prob- 
abilities of experiencing certain emotions in everyday !ife, and on 
demographie, persona! and situational factors that influence these 
probabilities. lt addresses basic questions in research on emotions , 
emphasizing the ecological and external validity of the results. 
While it opens a new way of looking at emotions, it also raises 
methodological questions concerned with the internai as weil as the 
construct validity of this method. 
The advan tage of the research approach adopted by Scherer et al. 
is that it allows the investigators to obtain large samples, of more 
than 1000 participants, which might represent a good part of the 
variation within a certain population. Therefore, population surveys 
are a well-suited strategy if one wants to explore the impact of differ- 
ent demographie variables and personality characteristics that are 
widespread  throughout  the population. 
We have discussed the problems of the study of Scherer et al. that 
appear from the viewpoint of diary research . One problem was the 
retrospective recall bias. This effect has been  shown  to  operate 
even if the time !ag between an event and the recording is under 
24 hours. Two other problems made reliable estimates of the fre- 
quencies difficult. Scherer et al. were not able to estimate how many 
subjects did not experience any emotion on the previous day. On 
the other hand, many people might have experienced  more  than 
one emotion the previous day, but had to select only one to report. 
Ali attempts to acquire knowledge about the frequencies of 
emotions in daily !ife are somehow confronted with the conceptual 
problem of how moods and unspecific emotional states can be dis- 
tinguished from emotions. Although Scherer  et  al.  tried  to solve 
this problem by asking people to report events that caused an emo- 
tion, sorne of their participants reported states that could be classi- 
fied as mood states rather than emotions (e.g. interest, relaxation, 
dissatisfaction). However, this problem is even more severe  in 
diary approaches, in which only the state, but not the underlying 
event, is assessed (e.g. our own studies or the studies of Myrtek, 
2004). 
In future surveys one could avoid sorne of the problems we have 
discussed here by asking potential participants to report every emo- 
tional event they experience the following day as rapidly as possible. 
In addition, results from the Scherer et al. study should be used to 
provide participants with a menu of frequently  used  emotions. 
This would help to obtain less idiographic responses that are better 
comparable. 
For studying the influence of situational factors as weil as the 
influence of personality on the emotional experience in more depth, 
though, we would recommend  a computer-assisted  diary approach. 
Authors' address: Department of Psycho logy, University of Fribourg, R.  de 
Faucigny 2, CH - 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland. [ email: Peter.W ilhelm @ unifr.ch, 
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Notes 
1. We think the appea ling term "risk factors" is somewhat inadequate. 1t su ggests
that emotions were rather dysfunctional affective responses , and it ignores their 
important  adaptive  function. 
2. We computed the percentage of peop le who indicated at ) east one emotion per
day, and we did it separately for every day of the observation-week. The percentage 
we report is the average percentage over the seven da ys of the week. 
3. Myrtek's studies were designed to answer the question whether  emotiona l
experi ences are accompan ied by  changes in the physiological system that can be 
detected via interoception. He showed  that  in  everyday  life this is not  the case. 
The perception of emotions was not link ed to changes in the physiological arousa l. 
However, it was lin ked to the evaluation of the situations according to cogn itive 
schemas. In addition he also found large individual differences. 
4. For every fami ly member we computed how often he or she reported each emo-
tional state item during the observation-week. In addition , we computed in  how 
many situations positive, negative or mixed states were reported and how often no 
emotion was indicat ed. 
5. Respondents were asked to choose between three intensity labels, with the
highest intensity being nearest to the respective scale anchor (a little, quite, highly) . 
ln arder to operationalize emotiona l experiences rather than mood states, we identi- 
fied onl y statements of negative emotional experiences by t argeting ratings of "quite" 
and "highl y", i .e. the scores nearest to the negative anchor l abel on the six-point scale. 
ln contras! to positive indications, these statements can be regarded as relatively dis- 
tinct experiences because they clearly depart from the averages (on the scales ranging 
from 1 to 6. means range between 4.60 and 5.08; SOs range between .97 and 1.16) and 
th us they can be understood as assigned to the respective sca le anchor. Using logistic 
regression analysis, we predicted the occurrence of emotional experiences du ring four 
observation units by a prior emotional experience (dummy -coded variables), givcn 
thal subsequent to the prior experience, no emotional experience was recorded. 
6. We only report data from the parents of our study to keep our results compar-
able with those of Scherer et al. Our parents can be regarded as belonging to almost 
the same popu lation as that from which Scherer et al. recruited their participants. 
However, there is one exception that needs to be mentioned. ln addition to 33 
German-speaking and 50 French-speaking families, we also took 13 families from 
the Italian-speaking part  of  Switzerland.  Scherer  et  al.'s  participants  were  taken 
on ly from the German- and French-speaking  parts. 
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